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1. Introduction
While much of the industrial organization approach to trade makes little reference to
multinational firms, a number of papers published over the last 15 years have been successful in
incorporating endogenous multinational firms into general-equilibrium trade models.  As a
consequence, we now have a reasonably well-developed set of theories which have implications about
the relationship between MNE activity and country characteristics such as size and relative
endowments.
One basic distinction in the theory is between "vertical" and "horizontal" firms.  Vertical
MNEs are firms that geographically fragment production into stages, typically on the basic of factor
intensities, locating skilled-labor intensive activities in skilled-labor-abundant countries and so forth.
Treatments of vertical investments include Helpman (1984), and Helpman and Krugman (1985).
Horizontal MNEs are multi-plant firms that replicate roughly the same activities in many locations.
Models of horizontal firms include Markusen (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 1992), and
Markusen and Venables (1997, 1998).
These two strains of literature have been relative disjoint, in large part due to technical
difficulties.  The early papers by Helpman and Helpman-Krugman relied on zero trade costs to
produce analytical solutions.  But under this assumption, there is no role for horizontal multi-plant
firms given plant-level scale economies.  Papers in the Horstmann-Markusen-Venables tradition
typically assumed that there is only one factor used in the MNEs sector, or that different activities
(e.g., headquarters and plant) use factors in the same proportion.  But under these assumptions, there
is little motivation for fragmenting production by stages.
More recently, there have been several attempts to integrate these models, allowing firms the2
options of multiple plants or geographically separating a headquarters and single plant (Markusen,
1997).  This has been referred to as the "knowledge-capital model" insofar as it is motivated by
assuming that knowledge is geographically mobile and a joint input to multiple production facilities.
There have been several models which estimate these models.  Results in Brainard (1997,
1993) give support to the horizontal model, and little support to the vertical model.  Several papers
by Ekholm (1995a, 1997, 1998a,b) give indirect support to the knowledge-capital model.  More
direct tests in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (1998), and Markusen and Maskus (1999), give good
support to the knowledge-capital model.  
A difficulty with these estimations and indeed a chronic difficulty in empirical work more
generally is that there is no explicit alternative hypothesis (H1) to the model being estimated.  Indeed,
authors are generally cautious about referring to "testing" the theory.  The purpose of this paper is
to attempt just such a test of the three models just mentioned: the knowledge-capital model
(henceforth KK), the horizontal model (henceforth HOR) and the vertical model (henceforth VER).
We will develop the basic theory briefly, and note how each model offers predictions about foreign
affiliate production of multinational firms as a function of characteristics of both the parent and the
host country.  The three models are then nested within an unrestricted model and estimated.
Results of this exercise provide strong support to the horizontal model (HOR), and decisively
reject the vertical model (VER).  The KK model performs much better than the VER model, but its
restrictions are rejected and one coefficient has the wrong sign.  The formal results thus accord well
with casual empiricism.  The overwhelming proportion of world direct investment is from high-
income developed countries to other similar high-income developed countries.  This suggests
horizontal investment is much more important in the world economy than vertical investment, at least3
vertical investments motivated by factor-endowment differences.  
2. Theory
Consider the following simple two-good, two-factor, two-country general-equilibrium model.
(1) There are two homogeneous goods, X and Y
(2) There are two factors, skilled (S) and unskilled labor (L), immobile between countries
(3) There are two countries, h and f
(4) Y - constant returns, perfect competition, L intensive
(5) X - (a) increasing returns to scale
(b) S intensive
(c) firms are Cournot competitors
(4) X production requires a "headquarters" (fixed cost) activity and a production activity
(5) an X firm may have one or two plants
(6) there is free entry and exit within an X "firm type" and among firm types
(a) firm type-N: single-plant national firms with their headquarters and
plant in the same country
(b) firm type-H: two-plant horizontal firms with their headquarters in one
country and plants in both countries
(c) firm type-V: single plant vertical firms with their headquarters and
plant in different countries
(7) transport costs between markets use L
(8) markets are segmented
(9) Options menu for the X sector
(a) there are firm-level as well as plant-level scale economies
(b) single plant firms may geographically separate plant and headquarters
(c) headquarters and plants have different factor intensities
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From the options menu, we can construct our three different models based on alterative
assumptions.  These are as follows:
KK model
(KK1) There are firm-level as well as plant-level scale economies
(KK2) A single-plant firm may geographically separate headquarters and plant
(KK3) Firm-level fixed costs are skilled-labor intensive relative to plant-level fixed costs and the
marginal costs of production.
VER model
(VER1) There are no firm-level scale economies
(KK2) A single-plant firm may geographically separate headquarters and plant
(KK3) Firm-level fixed costs are skilled-labor intensive relative to plant-level fixed costs and the
marginal costs of production.
HOR model
(KK1) There are firm-level as well as plant-level scale economies
(HOR2) A single-plant firm may not geographically separate headquarters and plant
(HOR3) Firm-level fixed costs, plant-level fixed costs and the marginal costs of production all
use factors in the same proportion.
While the VER and HOR models are fairly well know, that might not be the case with KK so
perhaps a few more comments are in order.  The KK model as laid out in Markusen (1997) and Carr,
Markusen, and Maskus (1998) makes three principal assumptions.
(A) Transportability: the services of knowledge-based assets are easily supplied to
geographically separate facilities.
(B) Factor Intensity:  Knowledge capital is skilled-labor intensive relative to final
production.5
(C) Jointness: the services of knowledge-based assets are (at least partially) joint
("public") inputs into geographically separate production facilities.
 
Properties (A) and (B) create a motive for the vertical fragmentation of production.  A firm's
headquarters should be located in a country where skilled labor is cheap while a single production
plant might be located in the other country.  Property (C) implies firm-level scale economies and
creates a motive for horizontal investments which replicate the same products or services in different
locations.  
What then does theory tell us about the relationship between multinational activity and
country characteristics?  In the VER model with no firm-level scale economies and no motive for
horizontal firms, multinational activity is driven entirely by differences in factor endowments.  Type-V
firms will be important when countries differ in relative endowments.  To make the point very
directly, multinationals will never exist between identical countries.
In the HOR model, we get more or less the opposite result.  MNEs will be most important
between similar countries, provided of course that there are positive trade costs.  MNEs will be less
important as the countries differ in size or in relative endowments.  The intuition here is that when
countries differ significantly, one will be a "favored" country as a headquarters for single-plant
national firms, either because of a large domestic market (a type-H firm must locate costly capacity
in a small market) and/or factor-price differences.
In the KK model, MNEs can exist both when the countries are similar (type-H firms), or
different in relative endowment, particularly if the skilled-labor-abundant country is small.  In the
latter case, the headquarters should be located in the skilled-labor-abundant country and the plant in
the large, skilled-labor-scarce country both for a factor-price motive and for a market-size motive.6
     
1These results are derived from a computer simulation model develop in Markusen (1997), following the
earlier work of Markusen and Venables (1997, 1998) with four firm types (no type-V firms).  It uses a
complementarity algorithm developed and implemented by Rutherford (1995a,b).  Marginal-revenue, marginal-
cost inequalities have outputs per firm as complementary variables, and markup-revenues, fixed-costs
inequalities have the numbers of firms active in equilibrium as complementary variables.
These results are summarized as follows.
KK model
(1) Both type-H and type-V multinationals can exist.
(2) Multinational are important when countries are similar in size and in relative endowments, and
trade costs are moderate to high (type-H multinationals).
(3) Multinationals are important when countries differ in relative endowments, particularly if the
skilled-labor abundant country is small.
VER model
(1) Only type-V multinationals can exist.
(2) Multinationals are important when countries differ in relative endowments.
(3) Multinationals do not arise between identical countries.
HOR model
(1) Only type-H multinationals can exist.
(2) Multinational are important when countries are similar in size and in relative endowments, and
trade costs are moderate to high.
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c depict simulation results for the three models.
1  The diagrams are the
world Edgeworth box, with the world endowment of skilled labor on one axis of the base and
unskilled labor on the other.  The vertical axis measures the real volume of affiliate production; that
is, the production by plants in country f of firms headquartered in country h (type Hh or Vh) and vice7
versa.  This will prove to be the most useful representation of theory, since the data give us numbers
on affiliate production and sales, but not on the numbers of firms (and certain not by "type"). The
endowment of country h is measured from the near, southwest corner (SW) and the endowment of
country f from the far, northeast (NE) corner.
Relative to Figure 1a, Figure 1b eliminates firm-level scale economies.  Relative to Figure 1a,
Figure 1c eliminates type-V firms, requires that S and L are used in the same proportion in fixed and
variables costs, and that there are significant skilled-labor requirements in the host country.
The KK and HOR models both show an inverted U-shaped curve along the SW-NE diagonal.
Type-H MNEs exist between countries with identical relative endowments, and affiliate production
is maximized when the countries are identical.  (When the countries are very different in size, single-
plant type-N firms located in the large country will have the advantage as noted above.)  In the VER
model, there is essentially no MNE activity along the SW-NE diagonal, and no role for country size
and size difference independent of relative endowment differences.
Along the NW-SE diagonal (countries differ in relative endowments), it is the KK and VER
models that are more similar to each other than to the HOR model.  In the latter model, type-H firms
become disadvantaged as they have to hire costly skilled labor in the skilled-labor scarce country.
Vertical firms on the other hand are encouraged to enter in both the KK and the VER model as
relative endowment differences increase.  
Yet there is another interesting difference between the VER and KK models. We see in the
VER model a relatively uniform relationship between endowment differences and total affiliate
activity, with little dependence on country size.  In the KK model, there is a interaction effect between
country size differences and relative endowment differences.  Affiliate activity is maximized when one8
country is relatively small and skilled-labor abundant.  In such a situation, most all X production is
by type-V firms, and all X produced by a type-V firm is affiliate production by definition.  In the KK
model, when countries differ significantly in relative endowments but are similar in size, many of the
multinational firms active in equilibrium are type-H firms, and only the non-headquarters-country
production of these firms counts as affiliate production.  So, for example, if country h is large and
skilled-labor abundant, then type-Hh firms might be important but most of their output is domestic
production in country h, not affiliate production in country f.  Thus affiliate production is less in this
region in the KK model than in the VER model.
Figure 2 shows the results in one direction only: production in country f by affiliates of firms
headquartered in country h.  The reason to look at the one-way results is that it greatly increases the
degrees of freedom in the econometric estimation to treat h-to-f and f-to-h as separate observations.
There are clearly non-linearities and non-monotonicities in these results.  But some clear ideas
emerge.  First, in the KK model there is a role for total income and size difference independent of
relative endowment differences (i.e., the SW-NE diagonal), but there is also a role for relative
endowment differences and an interaction between relative endowment differences and size
differences.  Outward affiliate activity of country h headquartered firms in country f is highest when
h is both small and skilled-labor abundant.
Second, the VER model gives no role for total income and the size difference between the
countries independent of relative endowment differences.  If we were to increase the density of
endowments (income) in the Edgeworth box in Figure 2b, the "wing" on the left would rotate
upwards (becomes steeper) with affiliate activity remaining zero on the SW-NE diagonal.  Thus the
model predicts that affiliate activity increases with total income but only in proportion to relative9
endowment differences.  Size difference between the countries plays no role (except at very extreme
values).
Third, the HOR model gives the clearest role for total income and country-size similarity.
While the maximum point of affiliate activity over the Edgeworth box is not at the center (it occurs
when country h is slightly skilled-labor abundant and slightly smaller than country f), affiliate activity
falls off from the maximum as the country gets either more/less skilled-labor abundant or
bigger/smaller.
To summarize the simulation results in Figures 1 and 2, the KK and HOR models predict an
important role for total two-country income and difference in income independent of relative
endowment differences, while the VER model predicts no such independent role.  The KK and VER
models predict a role for relative endowment differences with country h's outward affiliate activity
increasing in its skilled-labor abundance.  The KK model predicts a positive interaction between
skilled-labor abundance and a small size (or rather a negative interaction between skilled-labor
abundance and size) while the other two models do not.10
3.  Data Sources and Variable Construction
To implement the model, we define the following variables, which are listed in Table 1, and
discuss their construction.  The data form a panel of cross-country observations over the period 1986-
94.  First, we take sales volume of non-bank manufacturing affiliates in each country to indicate
production activity.  The U.S. Department of Commerce provides annual data on sales of foreign
affiliates of American parent firms and on sales of U.S. affiliates of foreign parent firms.  Thus, for
each year the United States serves as both the headquarters country for its firms producing abroad
and the affiliate country for foreign firms producing there.  There are 36 countries in addition to the
US for which we have at least one year of complete data.  Annual sales values abroad are converted
into millions of 1990 U.S. dollars using an exchange-rate adjusted local wholesale price index, with
exchange rates and price indexes taken from the International Financial Statistics of the International
Monetary Fund.
Real gross domestic product is measured in billions of 1990 U.S. dollars for each country.
For this purpose, annual real GDP figures in local currencies were converted into dollars using the
market exchange rate.  These data are also from the IFS.
Skilled labor abundance is defined as the sum of occupational categories 0/1 (professional,
technical, and kindred workers) and 2 (administrative workers) in employment in each country,
divided by total employment.  Variables SKh and SKj thus have a potential range of 0 (very skilled-
labor scarce) to 1 (very skilled-labor abundant). These figures are compiled from annual surveys
reported in the Yearbook of Labor Statistics published by the International Labor Organization.  In
cases where some annual figures were missing, the skilled-labor ratios were taken to equal the period
averages for each country.  The variable SKDIFF is then simply the difference between the relative11
     
2Some of these data were kindly provided by staff of the United States International Trade Commission.
skill endowment of the parent country and that of the affiliate country.  Our convention will be that
country i is the parent country and country j is the host country, so SKDIFF = SKi - SKj, is positive
if the parent country is skilled-labor abundant relative to the host.
The cost of investing in the affiliate country is a simple average of several indexes of
impediments to investment throughout the period, reported in the World Competitiveness Report of
the World Economic Forum.
2  The indexes include restrictions on ability to acquire control in a
domestic company, limitations on the ability to employ foreign skilled labor, restraints on negotiating
joint ventures, strict controls on hiring and firing practices, market dominance by a small number of
enterprises, an absence of fair administration of justice, difficulties in acquiring local bank credit,
restrictions on access to local and foreign capital markets, and inadequate protection of intellectual
property.  These indexes are computed on a scale from 0 to 100, with a higher number indicating
higher investment costs.  A trade cost index is taken from the same source and is defined as a measure
of national protectionism, or efforts to prevent importation of competitive products.  It also runs from
0 to 100, with 100 being the highest trade costs.  All of these indexes are based on extensive surveys
of multinational enterprises.    12
4. Estimation
Table 1 gives variable definitions and predicted signs for the three models.  The horizontal line
in Figure 1 divides the variables of interest in the theory (above the line) from a set of common
control variables which are expected to have the same signs in all equations (below the line).  
Variable definitions are given at the bottom of Table 1.  The first two variables, SUMGDP
and GDPDIFSQ capture the inverted U-shaped relationship along the SW-NE diagonal of the
Edgeworth box in Figure 2.  SUMGDP is predicted to be positive and GDPDIFSQ negative for the
KK and HOR models, but zero in the VER model.  As noted earlier, economic size and size
differences have no role in the VER model independent of factor-endowment differences.
The dummy variables D1 and D2 are designed to capture the results of Figure 2 that
predictions depend very much on whether or not the parent country is the skilled-labor abundant or
scarce country.  Variable D1 is non-zero if the parent is skilled-labor scarce and D2 is non-zero if the
parent is skilled-labor abundant relative to the host.
The complicated variable D2*SKDGDPD is designed to capture the interaction between being
skilled-labor abundant and small that we discussed in connection with the KK model.  This variable
is predicted to have a negative sign in the KK model (i.e., being small and skilled-labor abundant
increases outward investment), but be zero in the other two models.  
D2*SKDSUMG is an interaction term between factor abundance and the total size of the
"world" economy.  This term is positive if the parent is skilled-labor abundant, and zero otherwise.
This is the only "core variable" in the VER model, Figure 2b.  For a given SUMGDP, outward
investment is increasing in the parent country's skilled-labor abundance, and for a given SKDIFF,
outward investment is increasing in the total GDP.13
D1*SKDSUMG is positive if the parent country is skilled-labor scarce.  This term is
hypothesized to be zero in the KK and VER models: there is no outward activity to the SE of the
SW-NE diagonal of the factor box in the VER model (Figure 2b) and only a limited region where this
occurs in the KK model (Figure 2a).  This variable is however hypothesized to be negative in the
HOR model (Figure 2c).  Outward investment falls as the parent becomes skilled-labor scarce, but
outward investment continues well past the point where the parent first becomes skilled-labor scarce
(crossing below the SW-NE diagonal.
The first control variable (below the line in Table 1) is distance.  Theory does not give a clear
prediction as to its sign, since distance increases the costs of both trade (suggesting a substitution
toward investment) but also investment.  The second variable is the host-country's investment cost
index as discussed in the previous section; since higher numbers indicate higher costs, this variable
is predicted to be negative in all three regressions.  TCJ is the host-country's trade cost index and this
is expected to be positive, higher host-country trade costs encouraging inward investment.  TCI is
the parent-country's trade cost index and this is expected to be negative: it raises the costs of shipping
goods back to the parent from a branch plant, although this should not be important in the case of
outward horizontal investment.14
5. Results
Tables 2-5 present estimation results.  In all cases, the dependent variable is production in
country j by affiliates of country i parents.  Variables listed as zeros in Table 1 are omitted from the
regressions.  A unrestricted regression (UNREST) includes all variables.  
Tables 2 and 3 use only distance among the control variables.  Table 2 is a weighted-least-
squares estimation using a Park-Glejser technique with 509 observations.  There are a number of
missing observations for the dependent variable, and on inspection these involve parent countries that
are small and poor.  So a reasonable assumption is that these missing values are in fact zeros.  Table
3 enters these observations with a zero for affiliate production and estimates a Tobit equation on 722
observations.
Results in Tables 2 and 3 give strong support to the HOR model.  The restriction on this
model cannot be rejected by the F-test, and all coefficients have the right sign.  The KK model can
be rejected and in addition two coefficients (D2SKDGDPD, D2SKDSUMG) have the wrong sign
in Table 2 and one has the wrong sign in Table 3 (D2SKDGDPD) and the other is insignificant
(D2SKDSUMG).  
The VER model does poorly, and in Table 2 the crucial variable D2SKDSUMG has the
wrong sign.  All of the influence of total two-country income is picked up in the intercept, which is
large and positive, reversing the result in the other regressions.  This coefficient has the right sign in
the Tobit regression in Table 3 but again most of influence of size is picked up in the intercept.  The
restrictions that economic size and size difference plays no role in explaining multinational activity
is strongly rejected.
Tables 4 and 5 give results for WLS and Tobit regressions using all the control variables.15
INVCJ is always significant and has the right sign.  TCJ and TCI always have the right signs as well,
although TCI has weak significance in the WLS regressions while TCJ has weak significance in the
Tobit regressions.
Results in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with those in Tables 2 and 3.  HOR gets strong
support in the WLS regressions in terms of signs, significance, and F-test.  The restriction in HOR
is "marginally" rejected in the Tobit regression, but all variables in HOR have the right sign while they
do not in the KK regression.  
The coefficient on D2SKDSUMG has the right sign in the VER regressions in Tables 4 and
5, but the restrictions of the model are rejected.  Note again the reversal in the sign of the intercept
term in the VER regression suggesting that the independent influence of income is being absorbed
into the intercept.16
     
3If the effect of increased total income is to "lift up" the whole surface in Figure 1a (i.e., the effect of an
increase in SUMGDP does not depend on SKDIFF), then the specification in CMM is preferred for estimating
the KK model over the present formulation.  But it is clear that SKDIFF and GDPDIFF should be interacted
for the VER model (the effect of an increase in SUMGDP is proportional to SKDIFF), so we use that variable
here for the KK model as well.
6. Summary
The econometric results give strong support to the HOR model, and strongly reject the VER
model.  The coefficient estimates in the HOR model have the right signs and high statistical
significance.  An F-test cannot reject the HOR model's restrictions.  These results tell us what
researchers have long believed from casual empiricism: direct investment is most important between
countries that are similar both in size and in relative endowments.  It is the "hill" of Figures 1c and
2c rather than the "valley" of Figures 1b and 2b that best describes the world.  The VER model clearly
should not be taken seriously as a description of the world.
The weak performance of the KK model is somewhat troubling given strong support it
receives in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (1998).  Here, there does not seem to be a strong positive
roles for skilled-labor abundance and the interaction between skilled-labor abundance and size found
in CMM.  The data are the same in the two papers, but the estimating equation is different.  In CMM,
the authors used their "ideal" regression equation to estimate the model, without considering an
explicit alternative model.  In particular, SKDIFF was used as a variable by itself and not interacted
with SUMGDP.  All the central coefficients had the right sign and were highly significant indicating
an important role for skilled-labor abundance.  In the present paper, some compromises to the "ideal"
regression equation is made in order to nest the models, so as to provide a more meaningful test.
3 
Possibly more relevant, the effect of an increase in SKDIFF is complicated because SKDIFF
appears in two regressors in the KK model.  Using the mean values of GDPDIFF and SUMGDP17
     
4Also, Markusen and Maskus (1999) find support for the KK model by breaking down affiliate production
into that which is sold in the host country and that portion which is exported back to the parent country.
(which vary with the number of observations), partial derivatives of the four equations for the KK
model with respect to SKDIFF are positive for the two Tobit regressions, but negative for the two
WLS regressions.  For US outward investments (where GDPDIFF is large and positive), an increase
in SKDIFF always increases outward affiliate production.  Thus the results on the KK model are not
as clear as they seem from looking at individual coefficients alone and a positive role for SKDIFF is
not rejected here.  The interested reader is referred to CMM for a more detailed treatment of the KK
model.
4
We concluded by noting that the results emphasize the importance of formally considering an
alternative hypothesis.  If the VER model were estimated here alone, a researcher could conclude that
the model gets good support, except in WLS regression with only DIST as a control where
D2SKDSUMG has the wrong sign (Table 2).  Yet that "good support" quickly evaporates when we
look at the alternative HOR model.18
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Figure 1c:  Affilliate Production, 25% Trade Costs, HOR model








































































































































Figure 2c: Affiliate production of h-owned plants in f:  HOR model
origin for country hTable 1. Theoretical Predictions for Three Models   ( i = parent,  j = host)
Variable KK HOR VER
SUMGDP + + 0
GDPDIFSQ - - 0
D2*SKDGDPD - 0 0
D2*SKDSUMG + - +
D1*SKDSUMG 0 - 0
DISTANCE ? ? ?
INVCJ - - -
TCJ + + +
TCI - - -
SUMGDP  = GPDi + GDPj
GDPDIFF  = (GDPi - GDPj)         GDPDIFSQ  = (GDPi - GDP
SKDGDPD  =  SKDIFF*GDPDIFF  =  (SKi - SKj)*GDPDIFF
SKDSUMG  =  SKDIFF*SUMGDP  =  (SKi - SKj)*SUMGDP
D1  = -1   if  SKDIFF  =  SKi  -  SKj  <  0
 = 0    if  SKDIFF  =  SKi  -  SKj  >  0
D2  = 1   if  SKDIFF  =  SKi  -  SKj  >  0
 = 0   if  SKDIFF  =  SKi  -  SKj  <  0
D2 is non-zero if the parent country is skilled-labor abundant,
D1 is non-zero if the host country is skilled-labor abundantTable 2. WLS Estimation Excluding Investment and Trade Costs  (509 obs)
Variable    UNREST       KK      HOR      VER
SUMGDP 16.24 14.52 16.21
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
GDPDIFSQ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
D2SKDGDPD 1.19 0.07
           (0.72)        (0.98)
           No
D2SKDSUMG -8.98 -2.71 -7.88        -3.90
         (0.008)        (0.41)    (0.0001)        (0.04)
           No          Yes            No
D1SKDSUMG -13.35 -13.23
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes
DISTANCE -1.05 -1.32 -1.03 -1.84
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
                ?               ?               ?
INTERCEPT -29670 -22560 -29762 29432
         (0.005)        (0.04)      (0.005)    (0.0001)
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.35
F-Test  55.4 -0.65 150.9
Critical F 99% 6.65 6.65 3.34
Notes: Marginal significance levels are in parentheses; "Yes"
and "No" indicate conformity to predictions.Table 3. Tobit Estimation Excluding Investment and Trade Costs  (722 obs)
Variable    UNREST       KK      HOR      VER
SUMGDP 19.55 16.53 19.11
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
GDPDIFSQ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
D2SKDGDPD 6.76 3.23
           (0.06)        (0.40)
           No
D2SKDSUMG -17.96 0.46 -11.97 5.09
       (0.0001)        (0.90)    (0.0001)        (0.02)
         Yes          Yes          Yes
D1SKDSUMG -27.82 -27.49
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes
DISTANCE -0.93 -1.44 -0.91 -1.58
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
                ?               ?               ?
INTERCEPT -56105 -44847 -55205 17624
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
Log-Likelihood -6258 -6345 -6260 -6511
LR Test        174.0            4.0        506.0
Critical Chisq 7.88 7.88 14.86
Notes: Marginal significance levels are in parentheses; "Yes"
and "No" indicate conformity to predictions.Table 4. WLS Estimation Including Investment and Trade Costs  (509 obs)
Variable    UNREST       KK      HOR      VER
SUMGDP 15.04 13.41 15.01
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
GDPDIFSQ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
D2SKDGDPD 5.39 4.49
           (0.12)        (0.20)
           No
D2SKDSUMG -6.85 -0.93 -2.94 3.79
           (0.04)        (0.78)        (0.21)        (0.16)
           No          Yes          Yes
D1SKDSUMG -12.83 -12.53
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes
DISTANCE -1.31 -1.55 -1.23 -2.21
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
                ?               ?               ?
INVCJ -436.6 -442.9 -367.9 -639.3
         (0.005)    (0.0006)      (0.002)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes          Yes
TCJ 173.9 169.8 149.9 321.6
           (0.03)        (0.04)        (0.05)      (0.001)
         Yes          Yes          Yes
TCI -90.69 -169.8 -85.7 -85.2
           (0.26)        (0.04)        (0.29)        (0.40)
         Yes          Yes          Yes
INTERCEPT -7597 2549 -10592 43337
           (0.55)        (0.84)        (0.40)    (0.0001)
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.37
F-Test 43.04          6.60 87.41




































































































.Table 5. Tobit Estimation Including Investment and Trade Costs  (628 obs)
Variable    UNREST       KK      HOR      VER
SUMGDP 17.4 14.28 17.23
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
GDPDIFSQ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes          Yes
D2SKDGDPD 11.83 8.56
         (0.003)        (0.04)
           No
D2SKDSUMG -15.05 -0.52 -6.93 13.17
       (0.0001)        (0.89)     (0.001)    (0.0001)
           No          Yes          Yes
D1SKDSUMG -24.51 -23.97
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)
         Yes
DISTANCE -1.48 -2.01 -1.36 -2.63
       (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)
                ?               ?               ?
INVCJ -386.9 -280.4 -227.2 -616.3
         (0.008)        (0.07)        (0.09)    (0.0004)
         Yes          Yes          Yes
TCJ 134.1 61.5 76.3 261.2
           (0.15)        (0.53)        (0.40)        (0.03)
         Yes          Yes          Yes
TCI -136.7 -321.1 -125.1 -243.4
           (0.10)    (0.0001)        (0.13)        (0.02)
         Yes          Yes          Yes
INTERCEPT -26271 -6724 -32791 46477
           (0.07)        (0.65)        (0.02)    (0.0001)
Log-Likelihood -5747 -5801 -5751 -5933
LR Test        108.0            8.0        372.0
Critical Chisq 7.88 7.88 14.86
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